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ABSTRACT
Is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation? The
“right to earn a living” movement, gaining steam in policy circles and
winning some battles in the lower courts, says so. Advocates for this
right say that the right to compete in an occupation stands on equal
footing with our most sacred constitutional rights such as the right
to be free from racial discrimination. This Article takes a different
view, arguing that while there is a limited constitutional right to
compete in an occupation, it is—and should be—weaker than these
advocates claim. Some state licensing laws run afoul of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and courts are
wrong to flatly defer to state regulation of the occupations. But states
can have legitimate interests in restricting entry to a profession
and setting rules for its practice, and so we should not take an
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uncompromising view of occupational liberty. Rather courts should
(and most do) chart a middle path in considering due process and
free speech challenges to licensing laws. But while this middle path
may be right as a constitutional matter, it is too weak to effect real
reform in the area of excessive licensing. Solutions to the policy
problem of too much licensing must be found elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
Braden Boucek knew the type and so would anyone who has seen
a schoolyard bully at work.1 Boucek watched the attorney for the
Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barber Examiners preside
over a disciplinary hearing where a handful of unlicensed bar-
bers—almost all lacking representation by a lawyer—would lose
their livelihoods.2 The case that caught his attention was that of
Elias Zarate, who told the board that he was sorry that he cut hair
without the State’s approval, but he was grateful for the board’s
invitation to the hearing today to help him get a license, especially
since his Memphis barber shop was his only means of supporting
himself and his baby daughter.3 The board’s attorney explained
there would be no help with a license and Zarate owed $2,100 in
fines, including a charge for the board lawyer’s time.4
To Boucek, a leading attorney in the movement to challenge
unjust licensing laws in the courts, this case fit within the typical
pattern of disciplinary hearings before licensing boards—if you have
a lawyer, you win, if you don’t, you lose.5 It seemed to Boucek the
boards do not like an even playing field.6 So it did not surprise
Boucek—who was at the hearing representing someone else—that
Zarate lost his hearing, which lasted all of five minutes.7 What
struck Boucek was a detail that Zarate shared when explaining his
story: Zarate had never graduated from high school.8 Boucek
watched as Zarate approached a board staff member to ask how to
pay the fee and what, if anything, he could do to legally pursue his
profession.9 When the staff member explained that Elias should
1. Interview with Braden Boucek, Beacon Ctr. of Tenn. in Nashville, Tenn. (May 31,
2017).
2. Cf. Eric Boehm, Tennessee’s Haircut Cops Bust Barbers Who Lack High School Diplo-
mas, REASON FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/01/19/barber-cops-bust-
high-school-dropouts [https://perma.cc/DA6T-K2YF].
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Interview with Braden Boucek, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Boehm, supra note 2.
9. Interview with Braden Boucek, supra note 1.
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enroll in barber school, Boucek could not remain silent.10 He advised
Zarate that he should not let the board further deceive him.11 Zarate
could spend over a year in school, incur $20,000 in debt, and still not
be allowed to cut hair.12 Tennessee law bars all high-school dropouts
from barbering.13 Boucek had hoped to challenge the law in court
once he found the right plaintiff.14
Elias’s case against the State of Tennessee is part of a national
movement to invalidate unfair licensing requirements under the
Constitution by convincing courts to recognize a constitutional
“right to earn a living.”15 The movement is led by lawyers such as
Boucek who share a commitment to libertarian values that chafe at
the idea of needing a government’s permission to work.16 By far, the
largest share of these cases is brought by the Institute for Justice
(IJ), a public interest law firm dedicated to vindicating libertarian
causes in court.17 But smaller firms, such as Boucek’s Beacon Center
in Tennessee, are important contributors. These firms all rely on
private donations, because these suits primarily seek injunctive
relief rather than damages. And while attorney’s fees are awarded
in successful cases, winning a judgment is rare.18
But is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation?
Lawyers such as Braden Boucek and his colleagues at the IJ will tell
you that there is, and that it is no less important than the other
rights enshrined in the Constitution, such as religious liberty and
the right against self-incrimination.19 The law on the ground,
however, might suggest otherwise. There certainly is a constitu-
tional law of occupational licensing, and the pioneering work of the
“right to earn a living” movement has helped define its contours and
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Boehm, supra note 2.
14. Interview with Braden Boucek, supra note 1.
15. For an early use of that phrase, see Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living,
6 CHAP. L. REV. 207, 208 (2003). 
16. See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING (2010).
17. See About Us, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/ZSY4-6CM7].
18. Jason M. Wilson, Comment, Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, 64 AM. U. L.
REV. 385, 412 (2014).
19. See SANDEFUR, supra note 15, at 2.
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expand it in some important ways.20 But the constitutional protec-
tions offered to plaintiffs such as Elias Zarate have always been
limited, and will likely continue to be so.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of a right to earn a
living, or of a right to engage in an occupation.21 But attorneys such
as Boucek have two main constitutional tools in their kit when chal-
lenging an overly burdensome licensing restriction. First, Braden
can make claims for his clients under the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Licensing laws may run afoul of either the provision guaranteeing
due process or the provision that assures equal protection under the
law.23 Because the legal inquiry is almost identical under those two
provisions, they are often conflated in the cases themselves.24 These
provisions are discussed together in Part I.A. Second, if the pro-
fession involves speech, Boucek can make a claim on behalf of his
client under the First Amendment, claiming that the licensing re-
striction infringes free speech rights.25 Those claims are discussed
in Part I.B.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to “due process
of law,”26 a vague phrase that the Supreme Court has, over the
years, interpreted to protect workers from irrational occupational
regulations.27 Initially, constitutional “due process” meant only that
the laws would be applied to individuals through processes that
20. See Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/
occupational-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/3DES-A97C].
21. See generally U.S. CONST.
22. See id. amend. XIV.
23. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (“[T]he
significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have
frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood.”).
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were fair and transparent.28 Today, this set of protections is referred
to as “procedural due process,” distinguished from a more controver-
sial set of protections that became known in the early twentieth
century as “substantive due process.”29 To the extent there is a due
process right to compete in an occupation, it is found in the complex
and controversial substantive due process doctrine.
The substantive due process doctrine holds that there are con-
stitutionally protected rights that go beyond those expressly listed
in the text of the Constitution.30 A legislature—whether state or
federal—cannot make laws that infringe upon these “unenumerat-
ed” rights unless there is a legitimate health and safety concern that
the law addresses.31 Today, perhaps the most well-known of these
unenumerated rights is the right to privacy, which includes the
right to same-sex marriage32 and the (limited) right to abortion.33
Early last century, the Supreme Court recognized another right
under the due process clause—the right to freedom of contract—and
infamously used it to invalidate a state law regulating an occupa-
tion.34
In 1905, the Supreme Court decided Lochner v. New York,35 one
of the most maligned Supreme Court cases in American history. The
case challenged the constitutionality of a New York law limiting the
hours bakers could work.36 The State argued that the statute
protected bakers’ health, but the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states from
limiting workers’ freedom of contract without a more compelling
health and safety justification.37 The Court explained that if bakers’
health were reason enough to limit working hours, then state
legislatures could regulate any occupation in any way they saw fit:
28. See Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black
Hole of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1020-24 (2014).
29. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545-46 (3d
ed. 2006); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840, 846 (1998).
30. See, e.g., County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847.
31. Cf. id. at 857-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
34. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 52.
37. See id. at 57.
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No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one’s living, could
escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature
in limiting the hours of labor in all employments would be valid,
although such limitation might seriously cripple the ability of
the laborer to support himself and his family.38
If Lochner were still good law, it is easy to see how its language
could be used as a powerful tool against excessive occupational
licensing. This passage suggests that there is a constitutional right
to earn a living, and that the Due Process Clause can be used to
invalidate state occupational regulation that goes too far in limiting
that right.
But Lochner and the substantive due process right to liberty of
contract have not withstood the test of time.39 Even in 1905, the
opinion in Lochner was controversial; Justice Holmes dissented from
the opinion, saying that the case was “decided upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain,” and
that it was not for the Justices to substitute their economic judg-
ment for a legislature’s.40 That criticism of Lochner became es-
pecially important during the New Deal era, when the federal
government passed sweeping—and popular—economic regulation
that reached far into the economic life of the country.41 New Deal
legislation would almost certainly have been invalidated by the
Supreme Court Justices that had decided Lochner.42
By the time many of the New Deal laws came before the Court,
however, the Justices controlling its decisions were hostile to
Lochner and the economic rights it espoused.43 In part, that was
because the Justices saw the need for regulatory flexibility in the
face of the Great Depression.44 Their change of heart may also have
been because of a threat made by President Roosevelt.45 When it
38. Id. at 59.
39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 623.
40. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. Samuel R. Olken, Historical Revisionism and Constitutional Change: Understanding
the New Deal Court, 88 VA. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (2002) (book review).
42. See id. at 266-68.
43. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 621.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 621-22.
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became clear that the Court would use substantive due process to
invalidate President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the President claimed
that he would respond by “packing” the Court with up to six new
members for a total of fifteen seats.46 These new members would be
hand-selected by Roosevelt and would therefore be friendly to New
Deal legislation and adverse to cases such as Lochner that threat-
ened it.47 In the end, one Justice relented.48 Even though the
President’s threat may not have been the most important reason for
the change of heart,49 the episode is still commonly known as the
“switch in time that saved nine.”50
The switch was ultimately about what level of scrutiny the courts
would apply when reviewing economic regulations.51 Where Lochner
applied relatively strict review to state economic regulation, after
the switch, courts would use a lighter touch, known as “rationality
review.”52 When the Supreme Court abandoned Lochner, it left
behind the idea that state regulation, such as occupational licens-
ing, required an especially strong governmental justification or a
very close means-ends fit to pass constitutional muster.53 Any
economic regulation that was “rationally related” to a legitimate
state regulatory interest would survive judicial review.54 As the
Court created higher tiers of review for “fundamental” rights, it left
economic rights under substantive due process behind in the
“rationality review” bin.55
With the substantive due process right to work eviscerated, some
plaintiffs added another Fourteenth Amendment claim to their suits
challenging licensing laws. The Equal Protection Clause forbids
states from passing laws that deny anyone “the equal protection of
46. Id.
47. Cf. id.
48. Id. at 623.
49. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 164 n.118 (2011).
50. Olken, supra note 41, at 266.
51. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 624.
52. See id. at 622, 625.
53. See id. at 624.
54. Id. at 625.
55. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 40-41 (1973); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 540-42.
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the laws.”56 But because aggrieved workers were not a specially pro-
tected class, such as a racial minority, the equal protection claims
were also subjected to “rational basis” review.57 In practice, Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause claims boil down to one question:
did the licensing restriction serve, even indirectly or inefficiently,
some legitimate state interest?58
In regulating the professions, where there is usually at least a
thin theoretical public benefit to licensing, rational basis review
gave the states a free hand to regulate. In 1955, the Court decided
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,59 which is still the most
important case about the constitutionality of occupational licens-
ing.60 The case challenged a state statute that prevented opticians
from making an eyeglass lens without a new prescription from an
ophthalmologist or optometrist.61 The Court upheld the statute,
while acknowledging that the law “may exact a needless, wasteful
requirement in many cases.”62 The Court explained that “it is for the
legislature, not the courts” to decide such policy questions.63 The
opinion included a flat rejection of Lochner:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regula-
tory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought.64
The switch in time saved not only nine, but also most state occupa-
tional licensing laws.
Since Lee Optical, the rational basis test for state legislation has
not been very generous to workers challenging overly restrictive
licensing laws. In Meadows v. Odom, a Louisiana district court
accepted the state board’s contention that licensing florists helped
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (per curiam).
58. See, e.g., id. at 308, 314.
59. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
60. See id. at 491.
61. Id. at 486.
62. Id. at 487.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 488.
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promote health and safety by decreasing the risk of pricks by wires
in haphazardly arranged bouquets.65 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
recently upheld a state’s requirement that African-style hair
braiders obtain a cosmetology license, which requires 1500 hours of
classroom education—almost none of it relevant to braiding.66 The
court accepted the State’s health and safety justification even
though the risks were theoretical and remote, and the licensing
scheme had little to do with addressing those risks.67 And because
it is not even necessary under rationality review that the state
interest be articulated by the State, the court upheld the law under
two other “legitimate government interest[s]” that the court itself
contrived.68
At least two jurisdictions have found that the State does not need
any health and safety justification for occupational licensing laws.69
In Powers v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit considered a constitutional
challenge to Oklahoma’s law requiring a funeral license for selling
caskets.70 The court held that economically favoring members of the
funeral industry—at the expense of unlicensed sellers and
consumers—was itself a legitimate state interest.71 Thus, the court
rejected the State’s flimsy health and safety justification—that the
rule protected vulnerable, grieving consumers from sharp dealing
at the hands of sellers untrained in funeral service—and upheld the
law as rationally related to what the court believed was the State’s
true motive: economic protectionism.72 A naked desire to benefit one
politically powerful group (licensed funeral directors) over another
(unlicensed sellers) was itself a “legitimate state interest” under the
test.73 The Second Circuit recently joined the Tenth in finding that
intrastate economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest.74
65. Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated on other
grounds, 198 F. App’x 348, 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2006).
66. Niang v. Carroll, 879 F.3d 870, 872-74 (8th Cir. 2018).
67. Id. at 874
68. Id. at 873.
69. See Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015); Powers v.
Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004).
70. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1208, 2011.
71. Id. at 1225.
72. See id. at 1218, 1225.
73. Cf. id. at 1218, 1222.
74. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286.
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That opinion explained that “[m]uch of what states do is to favor
certain groups over others on economic grounds.... We call this
politics.”75
Victories under the rational basis test are few. But they may be
increasing, at least in occupational licensing cases. Some observers
even believe that the tide is turning in favor of stronger Fourteenth
Amendment protections against irrational licensing laws.76 In 2008,
the Ninth Circuit struck down the California Structural Pest
Control Board’s requirement that exterminators of rats, mice, and
pigeons—but not those of skunks and squirrels—obtain a state
license.77 Similarly, a federal court in Utah struck down that state’s
requirement that hair braiders obtain cosmetology licenses.78
Reaching the opposite conclusion as the Eighth Circuit in consider-
ing a similar licensing scheme,79 the District of Utah concluded that
requiring hair braiders to obtain licenses, which required hundreds
of hours of instruction on unrelated beauty practices, failed rational
basis review.80
Three circuits have explicitly held that economic protectionism is
not a legitimate state interest, striking down legislation where the
court finds no plausible benefit to public health and safety.81 In a
repeat of the facts of Powers v. Harris,82 the Sixth Circuit considered
whether Tennessee could limit casket selling to licensed funeral
directors.83 Explicitly disagreeing with the holding in Powers, the
Sixth Circuit held that “protecting a discrete interest group from
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”84
The court found only one justification that did not reek with “the
75. Id. at 287.
76. See David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A
Brighter Future Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 287, 287 (2016).
77. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the regulation
violated equal protection because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between these
kinds of exterminators).
78. Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (D. Utah 2012).
79. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
80. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1214-15.
81. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield, 547
F.3d at 992 n.15; Craigsmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
82. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).
83. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
84. Id. at 224.
2019] THE (LIMITED) RIGHT TO COMPETE IN AN OCCUPATION 1123
force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish85:” the scheme
would allow funeral directors to collect monopolistic profits in
selling coffins.86 The court struck down the regulation as violating
the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.87
Two other circuits have joined the Sixth in disallowing economic
protectionism as a legitimate state purpose.88 Although these cases
put these circuits in clear conflict with those upholding laws only
justified by naked protectionism, the Supreme Court has declined
to weigh in so far.
B. First Amendment Challenges
This circuit split and the recent rationality review victories in
licensing cases have given some hope to those who advocate for
stronger Fourteenth Amendment rights against excessive licensing.
But the deck is still stacked against plaintiffs raising Fourteenth
Amendment claims. Most courts afford states extreme deference in
applying rationality review to state licensing regulation.89 Perhaps
for this reason, firms such as IJ have sought other constitutional
avenues for redress. They have found some success in a surprising
provision: the First Amendment right to free speech.90
Many occupations involve speaking. Most obviously lawyers,
therapists, and real estate brokers speak for a living. But much of
what other professionals do—such as doctors, architects, and ac-
countants—involves speech. And some of the new additions to the
list of licensed occupations, such as fortune-tellers or tour guides,
are speech-based. By licensing these talking professions, the gov-
ernment literally restricts speech. When the government prevents
unlicensed tour guides from speaking to tourists about a historic
city, it stops a citizen from saying what he wants to say. And
because the restriction is content-based in the sense that it prevents
the speaker from standing on a corner and talking about a city’s
85. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).
86. Id. at 228.
87. Id. at 229.
88. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v.
Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 992 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008).
89. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 2004).
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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attractions but not about other topics,91 it seems inherently suspect
under the First Amendment. The simplicity of this argument is ap-
pealing and may account for some of the success that these suits
have had in invalidating regulation of the talking professions. But
First Amendment law, and the interests at stake when government
restricts occupational speech, are more complicated than this story
suggests.
The First Amendment’s right to free speech is expressed abso-
lutely; the text says that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech.”92 But even at the time of the Constitution’s
drafting it was recognized that reasonable governmental restrictions
on speech did not violate the right to free speech, and that there
were certain categories of speech—such as yelling “fire” in a
crowded theater—that were entirely outside of the Amendment’s
protection.93 Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed
complicated rules to govern when and how the government can
regulate speech.94
Restrictions on conduct with only an incidental effect on speech
receive intermediate scrutiny, which requires the law be “substan-
tially related” to an “important governmental objective[ ].”95 Direct
restrictions on speech fall into two categories.96 The first, content-
neutral restrictions that do not discriminate between one kind of
statement or another, also receive intermediate scrutiny.97 The
second, content-based restrictions that do distinguish between the
substance or viewpoint of a statement, instead receive “strict
scrutiny.”98 Strict scrutiny requires that the law be “narrowly
tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest[ ].”99
91. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1017-18, 1021.
94. See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6G3-CE7S].
95. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266
(1983).
96. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 642, 658.
99. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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The Supreme Court has not explained where within this doctrinal
framework occupational or professional speech is located. In fact,
the Supreme Court has not even clearly held that there is such a
thing as “professional speech.”100 The only opinion to squarely rec-
ognize “professional speech” as such and to articulate its status
under the First Amendment is a concurring opinion, which does not
have the force of law.101 In Lowe v. SEC, Justice White opined:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand
and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in
the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances
is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profes-
sion.102
According to Justice White, such professional speech is subject to
governmental regulation without any First Amendment protection,
but “[W]here the personal nexus between professional and client
does not exist,” the First Amendment applies.103
Several lower courts have used Justice White’s concurrence to
recognize a “professional speech” doctrine, but they have been
inconsistent about what kind of scrutiny it triggers and why.104 Part
of the inconsistency stems from the fact that licensing can restrict
speech in several different ways.105 Some government restrictions
forbid unlicensed speech.106 This category encompasses governmen-
tal prohibitions on unlicensed tour guiding and rules preventing
unlicensed practitioners from using a title such as “psychologist.”107
A second category includes government rules that compel or prevent
specific statements by licensed professionals.108 These restrictions
include the requirement that abortion providers give certain
100. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).
101. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Compare Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2013),
with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 228, 230 (3d Cir. 2014); Locke v. Shore,
634 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2011).
105. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228.
106. Cf. id.
107. See, e.g., Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 586 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
108. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
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information to their patients109 and the prohibition on lawyers
advising clients to commit crimes.110 Each of these scenarios may
involve different answers to the two most important questions
under First Amendment law: does the restriction primarily restrict
speech or conduct, and if it regulates speech, is it content-neutral?
The fact that the Supreme Court has never squarely answered
these questions provides an opportunity for firms such as IJ to try
out new theories of occupational speech under the First Amend-
ment, and they have had some notable successes.111 For example, IJ
brought a successful suit challenging the District of Columbia’s
requirement that tour guides acquire a license, which required
passing a 100-question test about the District’s history.112 The court
found it unnecessary to address the tour guide’s argument that it
was a content-based restriction on speech demanding strict scrutiny,
because the court held the restriction failed even intermediate
review.113 The court found the government’s argument, that the
history test helped prevent unscrupulous tour guides from treating
tourists unfairly or unsafely, was unsupported by “studies, anec-
dotal evidence, history, consensus or common sense.”114
IJ also won a case against the Kentucky Board of Psychology,
which had issued a cease and desist letter to a nationally syndicated
advice columnist whose parenting advice appeared in Kentucky
newspapers.115 John Rosemond had no other contacts with Ken-
tucky, but he was a licensed psychologist in North Carolina.116 The
Board claimed that his column constituted the unlicensed practice
of psychology, because it provided parenting advice to Kentucky cit-
izens and because it did not identify him as a “family therapist.”117
The court concluded that because the restriction took issue with the
substance of his column and with his use of the title “psychologist,”
it was content based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.118
109. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885, 900-01 (1992).
110. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
111. See, e.g., Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1000.
114. See id. at 1004.
115. See Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 578, 589-90 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
116. Id. at 586.
117. See id. at 585.
118. See id. at 581, 585.
2019] THE (LIMITED) RIGHT TO COMPETE IN AN OCCUPATION 1127
Finding little in the way of a “compelling government[ ] interest” for
the Board’s action against Rosemond, the court sustained the First
Amendment challenge.119
The uncertainty of the law here is illustrated by the contradictory
outcomes in other cases.120 For every case IJ has won in this area,
it has lost a similar case in a different jurisdiction.121 For example,
the Fifth Circuit upheld New Orleans’s licensing scheme for tour
guides, finding the restriction to be content-neutral and a reason-
able means to protect tourists.122 Although IJ convinced the court in
Rosemond to apply strict scrutiny to occupational speech,123 it could
not convince the court in another case challenging a licensing
scheme for interior designers to use any review whatsoever.124 In
Locke v. Shore, the court held “professional speech” was like yelling
“fire” in a theater—it was simply outside the scope of the First
Amendment’s protections.125
C. A Constitutional Right to Earn a Living?
Some commentators see the recent successes in these constitu-
tional suits as a crack in courts’ commitment to defer to states’ eco-
nomic legislation.126 They argue there is some judicial support—
especially in the circuits that have condemned economic protection-
ism as a legitimate state interest—for a constitutional “right to earn
a living” that stands on equal footing with any other right found in
the Constitution.127 As one commentator explains, the right is “as
‘central to individual dignity and autonomy’ as the freedom to
speak, marry, travel, vote, or exercise any other right that the Court
has held ‘fundamental.’”128
119. See id. at 586-89.
120. See Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
121. Id. (holding licensing regulation for tour guides valid).
122. Id.
123. See Rosemond, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 585.
124. See Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
125. See id. at 1290, 1292.
126. See Evan Bernick, Towards a Consistent Economic Liberty Jurisprudence, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 479, 505-06 (2016).
127. Cf. SANDEFUR, supra note 16, at 24.
128. Bernick, supra note 126, at 498-99 (footnote omitted) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015)).
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According to its advocates, the right to earn a living may be
experiencing a recent resurgence, but the right itself is hardly
new.129 Timothy Sandefur, a leading advocate of the right to earn a
living and the author of a book by that name, traces the origins of
that right back to the founding.130 The American Revolution had
been fought to vindicate American economic liberty from the
British,131 and so the Constitution specifically protected economic
liberty in clauses such as the Contracts Clause and Privileges and
Immunities Clause.132 This commitment to economic freedom was
likewise a driving force behind the Fourteenth Amendment.133
According to Sandefur, the Reconstruction-era Congress was keen
to protect former slaves’ economic rights, especially their right to
earn a living, given the long history of these rights being denied
entirely to African-Americans.134 Advocates such as Sandefur argue
the modern interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—that
privileges other rights above economic liberty—is a fundamental
misunderstanding of Congress’s original intent.135
Within the movement, there is disagreement about what doctrinal
changes are needed to resurrect this once-vibrant right.136 Some call
for a revision of the rational basis test that would place a heavier
burden on the government to justify economic regulation as “ratio-
nal.”137 Others see the rational basis test as beyond salvation and
call for a different tier of review, such as intermediate scrutiny, for
economic rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable
licensing laws.138 Within this debate lies another controversy: what
to do about the specter of Lochner? Some advocates claim that
increased scrutiny of economic regulation does not risk a return to
129. Cf. SANDEFUR, supra note 16, at 23-24.
130. Id. at 17; Telephone Interview with Timothy Sandefur, Vice President for Litig.,
Goldwater Inst. (Feb. 12, 2018).
131. SANDEFUR, supra note 16, at 23-25.
132. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
133. SANDEFUR, supra note 16, at 39.
134. Id. at 3-5.
135. Id. at 83-84.
136. See Dana Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test—Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 373, 399 (2016).
137. Id. at 399-400.
138. Cf. John O. McGinnis, Reforming Constitutional Review of State Economic Legislation,
14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 525 (2016).
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the bad old days where courts lightly invalidated state regulation.139
These commentators observe that the wide gulf between modern
rationality review and Lochner leaves plenty of middle ground for
judicial approaches that would take the right to compete in an
occupation seriously.140 Others unapologetically call for a return to
Lochnerism and its commitment to strong economic rights against
the State.141
If you ask the advocates of the right to earn a living about its
prospects, most are optimistic about the future.142 Rob Johnson of IJ,
for example, says things are moving in the right direction, citing a
long and growing string of federal cases where courts have shown
a willingness to apply meaningful review to state economic regula-
tion.143 Sandefur agrees, but notes real change will come when this,
and the next generation of federal judicial appointees, begin to
shape constitutional law.144 Sandefur hopes these judges will shed
the old conservative idea that resisting incorrect precedent—such
as Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence since the New Deal—is
improper judicial activism.145
All these advocates agree that the recent developments in both
Fourteenth and First Amendment cases challenging occupational
licensing laws are good news.146 According to the leading right-to-
earn-a-living advocate in the legal academy, the current “doctrinal
chaos” created by the Powers-Craigmiles circuit split presents “an
opportunity for advocates of greater occupational freedom to nudge
courts beyond the collapsing fundamental/nonfundamental rights
139. Id. at 530.
140. Id.
141. BERNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 125-29.
142. See Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST. (Dec. 2016), https://ij.org/ll/december-2016-
volume-25-issue-6/economic-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/GV4N-J3PQ] (explaining the recent
success of economic liberty cases in Texas).
143. See Telephone Interview with Rob Johnson, Inst. for Justice (Feb. 9, 2018); see also
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013) (striking down the reg-
ulation); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d at 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the reg-
ulation failed rational basis review); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding the regulation could not pass “even rational basis review”).
144. Telephone Interview with Timothy Sandefur, supra note 130; see also SANDEFUR,
supra note 16, at 292-93.
145. Telephone Interview with Timothy Sandefur, supra note 130.
146. Bernstein, supra note 76, at 302-03.
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dichotomy that dominated due process jurisprudence for decades.”147
And the litigators agree.148 In fact, Rob Johnson says one of the
current goals of IJ is to deepen the circuit split in the hopes that the
Supreme Court will take the case and resolve it in their favor.149
II. THE FUTURE OF OCCUPATIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
Proponents of the right to earn a living champion the Powers-
Craigmiles circuit split and the recent First Amendment victories
against licensing regulation as cracks in the long-standing judicial
deference to legislative choices about licensing.150 There is reason to
doubt, however, that courts will—or should—recognize a strong
First or Fourteenth Amendment right to occupational freedom.151 A
correction in the direction of stronger constitutional review of
occupational regulation is appropriate, and the right to earn a living
movement has been instrumental in bringing that about.152 But
courts will not and ought not go as far as advocates of the right
demand.
A. Rationality Review and the Circuit Split
Right to earn a living advocates are correct that mere economic
protectionism is not a constitutionally acceptable justification for a
state law.153 But they are wrong to suggest that the three circuit
court opinions saying so have opened a new path to stronger
economic rights under the Constitution.154 The Constitution places
147. See id.
148. See William H. Mellor, Turning the Spotlight on Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST.
(Aug. 2014), https://ij.org/ll/liberty-law-august-2014/l-l-8-14-turning-the-spotlight-on-econo
mic-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/A45P-VCKE].
149. Telephone Interview with Rob Johnson, supra note 143.
150. See Sandefur, supra note 15, at 256.
151. See Bernstein, supra note 76, at 302.
152. See id. at 302-03.
153. See Roger V. Abbot, Comment, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Govermental
Interest Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 492 (2013).
154. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the
health and safety justifications for the regulation was “irrational”); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547
F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Needless to say, this type of singling out, in connection with
a rationale so weak that it undercuts the principle of noncontradiction, fails to meet the
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some minimal restrictions on the government’s ability to enact
unfair and irrational laws.155 If these restrictions are to have any
meaning, then judicial review of a law must at least ask if it is
aimed at some public-regarding goal.156 But holding so hardly
portends the collapse of the distinction between fundamental and
economic rights under the Constitution or a return to the kind of
second-guessing the Court did in Lochner.157
1. Naked Preferences and Economic Protectionism
The Constitution, in both its structural provisions establishing
the process of creating law and its provisions creating rights against
unfair laws, mostly enumerated in the Bill of Rights, protects
minority interests from the tyranny of the majority.158 These
commitments reflect the idea that, while self-governance is the
touchstone of democratic decision making, not all decisions by a
majority are fair.159 Rights of the minority need some protection
against pure majoritarian decision making.160 Substantive rights
against unfair laws, such as those found in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, operate as a check against laws that unfairly burden
the minority.161 Sometimes, majoritarian decision making is unfair
because it harms groups who have traditionally been victims of
discrimination, such as racial minorities.162 In these instances, gov-
ernment action is closely scrutinized.163 But sometimes, majoritar-
ian decision making is unfair not because of discrimination, but
relatively easy standard of rational basis review.”); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“This measure to privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense of
consumers is not animated by a legitimate governmental purpose and cannot survive even
rational basis review.”).
155. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (implying that a court may strike down
a law that “burdens a fundamental right [or] targets a suspect class”).
156. See id. at 635 (discussing how the objective must serve a public interest).
157. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 (stating that the decision was not a return to Loch-
ner).
158. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
159. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
160. See id.
161. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 409 (2016). 
162. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
163. See id. at 11.
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because the decision benefits a group with raw political power.164
When the majority rewards political power for no public-regarding
reason, they are acting on what Professor Cass Sunstein calls
“naked preferences.”165
A naked preference for one politically powerful group is not a
constitutionally legitimate reason for legislation.166 Thus, the Court
has struck down regulation—even economic regulation—where it
seemed motivated by nothing more than animus for a group ad-
versely affected by it.167 In the context of occupational licensing, the
Court has tethered the legitimacy of licensing schemes to their
effect on the public welfare.168 As far back as 1889, the Court held
that while every citizen has the right “to follow any lawful calling,
business, or profession he may choose,” that right is not infringed
by licensing regulation aimed at “the protection of society.”169 This
notion that laws must be justified by some public purpose should
seem unobjectionable, both as a matter of common sense and as a
matter of Constitutional design.170 Public representation and checks
on political power were obviously meant to ensure public-regarding
regulation.
Yet, as the circuit split indicates, this notion is controversial.171
And, although the controversy is couched in terms of whether na-
ked preference for one group over another is a legitimate state
164. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1727-28 (1984).
165. Id. at 1689, 1723 (defining the term “naked preference” to mean the “underlying evil”
of “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on
the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they
want”).
166. See id. at 1727-28.
167. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution effectively barring homosexuals from participating in the
political process violated the Equal Protection Clause); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that purposefully
discriminated against hippies because the discrimination was not a legitimate government
interest justifying the amendment).
168. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889).
169. Id. at 121-22.
170. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
171. Compare Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying rational
basis scrutiny and holding that economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest), with
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (deciding to use a more rigorous form
of rational basis).
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interest,172 the actual controversy lies in the difficulties of sorting
out naked preferences from all other kinds of legislation.173 As long
as one has a right to petition the government, exertion of raw
political power in the form of lobbying will always be a part of
legislative action.174 The circuits that have held naked economic
protectionism to be a legitimate state interest defend such protec-
tionism not because they believe it serves some good, but rather
because they believe a rule asking courts to sort out naked protec-
tionism from protectionism mixed with a public benefit (which
probably describes most legislation) is impossible.175 They are
concerned that using the Constitution to weed out legislation that
does not benefit the public is so error-prone as to be futile.176
These concerns are overblown. First, courts make difficult judg-
ments about legislative motivations all the time, including in the
constitutional context.177 For example, when the Supreme Court
invalidated state bans on gay marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, it
proceeded one-by-one with each proffered public-regarding justifi-
cation and found each lacking, leaving animus towards gays as the
only plausible reason for the regulation.178 Courts can, and in at
least three circuits do, apply such reasoning to occupational
licensing schemes.179 This was the approach taken by the court in
Craigmiles when it rejected the State’s health and safety justi-
fications leaving naked protectionism as the last standing justifi-
cation.180 Second, rationality review does not require courts to
discern the most important or real reason for the legislation.181 If
there is a plausible public-regarding reason for the regulation, it
172. See Sunstein, supra note 164, at 1695.
173. See id. at 1696.
174. See id. at 1697.
175. See, e.g., Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222-23; see also Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793
F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (Droney, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
176. Cf. Sensational Smiles, LLC, 793 F.3d at 284 (majority opinion).
177. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding a ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional).
178. See id. at 2605-08.
179. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v.
Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir.
2002). 
180. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228-29.
181. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-77 (1980).
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will pass.182 The process-of-elimination method used in Craigmiles
and Obergefell is a workable way to establish whether the legisla-
tion is appropriately public-regarding.183
2. Are Weaker Rights Against Economic Regulation Justified?
Giving some protection to people harmed by irrational regulation
that confers economic benefits on one group with no public benefit
is both desirable and plausible. But how much? Legislation that
prefers one race over another gets reviewed strictly by courts.184
Should regulation that economically benefits one politically
powerful group over another get the same standard? In other words,
is it appropriate to be more deferential to states in the economic
context than in the context of racial discrimination? The advocates
of the “right to earn a living” movement think that both kinds of
regulation implicate fundamental rights, and the distinction the
Court currently makes between “economic” and “personal” rights
under the constitution is wrong.185
Higher deference for economic regulation is justifiable on many
grounds, and the case of licensing illustrates them.186 First, states
have strong, legitimate interests in regulating the economic sphere,
where unequal bargaining power can make pure market outcomes
unfair or free competition may result in dangerous or low quality
products for consumers.187 The latter is a justification for occupa-
tional licensing that places reasonable limits on the right to compete
in an occupation.188 Stricter forms of review tie states’ hands too
strongly to a libertarian philosophy of the marketplace.189 This was
the concern that leveled Lochner, and it is still powerful today.190
Second, market regulation concerns public life, which most view as
a more legitimate area for regulation than the private lives of
182. Cf. id. at 176.
183. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229.
184. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1948).
185. Economic Liberty Backgrounder, INST. FOR JUST. (2018), https://ij.org/issues/ economic-
liberty/backgrounder/ [https://perma.cc/LT5T-RF8U].
186. See Chemerinsky, supra note 161, at 409.
187. Cf. id. at 407.
188. Cf. id. at 409.
189. See id. at 408-09.
190. See id. at 408.
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citizens, which are usually implicated by rights that receive stricter
scrutiny under the Constitution.191 Finally, as a historical and
cultural matter, most Americans have stronger gut reactions to
limitations on their personal freedom as compared to their profes-
sional freedom.192
If states have a relatively strong interest in regulating the
economic sphere, then courts are understandably wary of invalidat-
ing economic regulation such as occupational licensing.193 Lochner
was and is unpopular because it substituted the policy judgement
of unaccountable federal judges for that of elected state officials.194
Licensing regulation requires trading off incommensurable values,
because the costs of licensing are typically economic while the
benefits inure to health and safety—values notoriously difficult to
quantify.195 The courts’ ongoing commitment to leaving Lochner in
the past is at least partly motived by a recognition that these trade-
offs are political and best left to an elected body with the democratic
legitimacy to speak for the people.196
Perhaps even more fundamentally, courts recognize that economic
regulation is poorly suited to federal courts hearing one case at a
time,197 and this is no less true about occupational regulation. First,
state legislatures and agencies are superior to federal courts in
making decisions about licensing because they have the ability to
collect and analyze data about the costs and benefits of regulation.198
A state agency can set up complaint centers where consumers can
191. See Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism: Defending Carolene Products, 14
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 571-72 (2016).
192. Cf. id. at 572 (arguing that rational basis review has substantive justification in part
because Americans are not as personally invested in economic regulation as they are in
regulation addressing private rights).
193. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2004).
194. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003).
195. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 41 (1990), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-_occupational_licensing.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FF9Q-JE 4G].
196. See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821,
822-23 (2005).
197. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
198. See JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH REG-
ULATORY REVIEW: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE RULEMAKINGS 23, 38, 423
(2010), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experiments_with_Regulatory_
Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XF9-2QTW].
1136 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1111
describe unsafe or unsatisfactory experiences with service provid-
ers, providing the state agency with information about the possible
benefits of a licensing restriction on providing that service. Agencies
can also collect data about the costs of a licensing restriction
through a similar mechanism by soliciting comments or complaints
from would-be providers about their intent to enter the market but-
for licensing rules barring their practice.199 And agencies can employ
economists and other data analysts to predict the effect of licensure
restrictions on the relevant outcomes, although states rarely do so
at the moment.200
Second, states have a bigger and more systemic perspective on the
regulatory need than that of a judge considering one suit involving
one aspect of a licensure scheme.201 All regulation will be over- and
under-inclusive, and may involve some arbitrariness on the
margins. Robust constitutional protection for access to an occupa-
tion would sacrifice the big-picture vision with which agencies
approach problems. Where imperfections in a regulatory scheme
have outsized harm—such as when a regulation discriminates based
on race—vindicating an individual’s rights through constitutional
suits makes sense. But as the Court has recognized by creating tiers
of scrutiny, not all regulatory imperfections implicate strong rights
to redress.
Does Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.202 strike the
right balance between the limited right to compete in an occupation
and deference to states’ economic regulation? Yes and no. The
outcome of the case was probably reasonable, but the reasoning
went too far and has been used by courts to abdicate their role in
policing the constitutional right to compete.203 The boundary
between the practice of optometrists and opticians—what each
professional can and cannot do—is a question properly answered by
a state legislature. And the rule that opticians cannot make lenses
without a prescription has some rational basis in public health and
199. See id. at 133 (“Small Business Regulatory Fairness Board reviews new rules and
whether existing rules create barrier to business that outweigh public benefit.”).
200. Id. at 143.
201. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
202. 348 U.S. 483, 487, 491 (1955).
203. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
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safety.204 The rule could have been upheld on those grounds, but
instead the Court used the case to make grand pronouncements
against Lochner-style review. By its own words, the Court seemed
to uphold a “needless, wasteful” requirement,205 inviting future
courts to find rationality where there is none. This overcorrection
away from Lochner has been the unfortunate legacy of Lee Optical.
3. The Supreme Court and Economic Rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment
Given that the Powers-Craigmiles split implicates all of these
important questions about rationality review for economic regula-
tion,206 why has the Supreme Court declined to weigh in? Part of the
reason may be that the Court does not like its options. It can affirm
Powers, and reduce rationality review to a nullity; all legislation
benefits some group, and if that benefit itself is a legitimate state
interest, then rational basis review goes away.207 Or it can affirm
Craigmiles, but doing so will also probably require the Court to
grapple with the more difficult questions that the cases present
about how far a court can look into a state’s motives.208 As evidenced
by the volumes of scholarly literature dedicated to that question, it
is hard to answer, and the Court has given mixed signals.209
Another reason why the Court may have avoided addressing the
Powers-Craigmiles split is that bad facts make bad law. The debate
between Powers and Craigmiles—whether states could justify
regulation as economic protection without appeal to public-regard-
ing purposes—was only possible in a context where state interests
are so flimsy and the regulation so onerous. It is no coincidence that
204. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 491.
205. Id. at 487.
206. Compare Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222-23 (holding that the regulation was consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment), with Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002)
(deciding to use a more rigorous form of rational basis review).
207. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222-23.
208. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229.
209. See generally, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 843; Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784
(2008).
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both cases concerned occupational licensing, which, as we have seen,
represents some of the worst of state regulation.210 If the Court
agrees that occupational licensing has gone too far in some cir-
cumstances—which its holding in 2015’s North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC211 suggests—then it may not
want to clarify constitutional rules in this particularly fraught area
of regulation. The Court may be sympathetic to the reasoning of
Craigmiles because of the abuses consumers and workers have
suffered in the name of licensing. But some Justices may be con-
cerned that affirming Craigmiles would have ripples beyond
occupational licensing. Such a holding could subject all state eco-
nomic regulation to more intense judicial scrutiny and raise the
specter of Lochner.
For the same reason, the “right to earn a living” enthusiasts who
see the recent successes in occupational licensing schemes as open-
ing a door to strong economic rights under the Constitution are
likely to be disappointed. Occupational licensing is increasingly
outrageous and increasingly unpopular.212 Successes in these suits
hardly portend a return to strong economic rights as a general
matter. As Professor Suzanna Sherry has said, when conservative
libertarians focus on occupational licensing victories to claim suc-
cess for stronger economic rights in general, they “are using a very
small tail to wag a very large dog.”213
B. The First Amendment and Professional Speech
There are also reasons to be skeptical about locating a right to
earn a living in the First Amendment. The First Amendment can
only be used when a licensing scheme implicates speech, and only
a subset of inefficient licensing regulations do so.214 Perhaps more
210. Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 586-90 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (finding no
compelling government interest in an attempt by the Kentucky Board to identify and regulate
a nationally syndicated advice columnist as a “family therapist”); see also Edwards v. District
of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 999, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding the District of Columbia’s
requirement that tour guides acquire a license too restrictive).
211. Cf. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).
212. See Occupational Licensing, supra note 20.
213. Sherry, supra note 191, at 568.
214. See supra Part II.B.
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fundamentally, states have strong interests in regulating profes-
sional speech, and will inevitably receive deference in most First
Amendment inquiries.215
The recent First Amendment jurisprudence of “professional
speech” percolating through the lower courts—and the Supreme
Court’s recent foray into the subject—is contradictory and complex,
but a fair reading of the cases reveals a common theme: the gov-
ernment has the right to restrict professional speech to profession-
als and, at times, to restrict what professionals can say.216 Cases
applying strict scrutiny to licensing schemes are few, and seem to
be triggered, as in the Fourteenth Amendment context, by bad
facts.217 Once one recognizes that there is a legitimate government
purpose for restricting professional speech, it follows that whatever
“professional speech” doctrine comes out of the current jurispruden-
tial morass will need to afford legislatures some flexibility in de-
ciding what kinds of professional speech threaten public health and
safety.218 Intermediate scrutiny best captures the kind of balancing
of rights and regulatory efficiency that licensing regulation entails.
1. Locating Professional Speech in the First Amendment
Framework
The dominant approach in the lower courts has been to apply
intermediate scrutiny to licensing rules that restrict speech and to
uphold restrictions if they are substantially related to an important
governmental interest.219 Although there are cases that purport to
apply strict scrutiny to a restriction on professional speech,220 and
those that purport to apply no scrutiny at all,221 the emerging trend
has been to use intermediate scrutiny to trade off a professional’s
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. See, e.g., Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
217. See, e.g., Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 581, 585 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
218. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing strong state interest in economic regulation and
public life).
219. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
168 (2002).
220. See Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2016); Rosemond, 135 F.
Supp. 3d at 585.
221. See Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013); Locke v.
Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2011).
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speech rights against a state’s regulatory interest.222 This level of
scrutiny is appropriate because it allows some regulatory flexibility
in an area where a state’s interest in regulation is high, while also
recognizing that professional speech implicates free speech values,
albeit in a limited way.
For every way in which a state can restrict professional speech,
it has a theoretically legitimate interest in doing so.223 First, if
licensure is appropriate for a profession, then governments should
be able to restrict who can claim to be a member of that profession.
In this circumstance, an unlicensed individual claiming to be a
member of a licensed profession is committing fraud. An unlicensed
physician is not a “physician” at all, and claiming so invites det-
rimental reliance by members of the public who would have no par-
ticular reason to doubt that claim. The professional circumstance
is thus different from the political sphere, where one’s false claims
to military honors,224 for example, do not invite consumers to make
themselves vulnerable to professional malpractice.
Second, if licensing is appropriate, then it follows that, for “talk-
ing” professions, the licensing scheme will necessarily prevent some
unlicensed individuals from speaking freely.225 For example, almost
all of a lawyer’s practice is verbal, whether providing advice to
clients or making arguments to courts. If the profession passes the
test for whether licensing is appropriate—and the legal profession
probably does—then limiting who can act as a lawyer necessarily
entails limiting who can say what. Unlicensed “lawyers” who claim
that the First Amendment protects their right to provide clients
with legal advice are, at bottom, saying that the state cannot
regulate entry into the practice of law at all.
Third, if licensing is appropriate for a given “talking profession,”
then the state also has at least some interest in controlling what
licensed professionals can say. For the talking professions, the
speech itself is the service provided. The quality of that service
222. See, e.g., Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014); King v.
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 229, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2014); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fl.,
760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014).
223. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
224. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
225. See, e.g., Kagan, 753 F.3d at 562 (upholding New Orleans’s licensing scheme for tour
guides).
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depends on what is said, and so if the government has a legitimate
interest in regulating service quality in the public interest, then it
must also have the right to prescribe and proscribe categories of
statements. 
The recent gay conversion therapy cases illustrate this point.
California and New Jersey passed laws prohibiting therapists from
providing “sexual orientation conversion efforts” (SOCE) to minors,
subjecting offenders to professional discipline or license revoca-
tion.226 SOCE, like all talk therapy interventions, is wholly com-
prised of speech, but both the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld the
bans as advancing a legitimate state interest in safe therapy for
minors.227 The restrictions easily passed intermediate scrutiny since
the states were able to point to scholarly research and a professional
consensus showing that conversion therapy can trigger depression,
anxiety, and even suicide.228 Restrictions on what professionals can
say can also implicate other legitimate state interests besides con-
sumer protection. The ethical rules that prevent lawyers from ad-
vising clients to commit crimes or to abuse the bankruptcy laws229
protect the state’s own legal institutions against abuse. The public
has a strong interest in fewer crimes and in a functional, fair bank-
ruptcy system.
Note that these legitimate state interests in restricting speech
through licensing all depend on a good reason to use licensing in the
first place. Several of the recent professional speech cases foundered
on this requirement, although the cases typically do not say so
explicitly. For example, the DC Circuit opinion that struck down a
licensing exam for tour guides seemed hostile to the idea that tour
guiding was the kind of occupation that needed licensing to protect
the public.230 Likewise, in Byrum v. Landreth, the Fifth Circuit
rejected a “title use” scheme for interior designers on First Amend-
ment grounds.231 Again, the court seemed to reject the idea that the
226. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2018), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2018).
227. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 728
F.3d 1042, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2013).
228. King, 767 F.3d at 236-39; Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1057.
229. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246, 248 (2010).
230. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
231. 566 F.3d 442, 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2009).
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public needed protection from the unlicensed practice of interior
design.232
Because of the strong state interests in restricting professional
speech where licensing is appropriate, the few cases applying First
Amendment strict scrutiny to a licensure restriction are wrong.233
Examining the facts of these cases, however, may explain courts’
overzealousness. One of these cases is the Rosemond case, where the
Kentucky Board of Psychology sent a cease-and-desist letter to a
syndicated advice columnist.234 The Board’s conduct there was so
outrageous, and so antithetical to First Amendment values, that the
court quite understandably wanted to throw the book at the
Board.235 But the board’s conduct would have also failed intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Something similar may have motivated the court in
Serafine v. Branaman, in which the Texas State Board of Examiners
of Psychologists demanded that a professor of psychology refrain
from describing herself as a “psychologist” in campaign materials.236
There, the court applied strict scrutiny and found a First Amend-
ment violation.237 To the extent that case was about professional
speech, rather than campaign speech, intermediate scrutiny would
have been more appropriate, and would have led to the same out-
come.
The cases that afford professional speech no First Amendment
protection at all are also wrong.238 Professional speech can implicate
important First Amendment values. Most professions that pass the
test for licensing require their members to not only know but also
to contribute to a vast, complex, and growing store of knowledge.239
Affording no speech protection at all to professionals may limit the
information sharing and debate necessary to develop this knowl-
edge. Forcing or prohibiting the speech of professionals also creates
the risk that the government will use professionals as mouthpieces
232. See id. at 447-48.
233. See, e.g., Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2016); Rosemond v.
Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 588 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
234. Rosemond, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
235. Cf. id. at 587-88.
236. 810 F.3d at 357-58.
237. See id. at 361, 370.
238. See, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
239. Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016).
2019] THE (LIMITED) RIGHT TO COMPETE IN AN OCCUPATION 1143
for their own message or to suppress the free flow of information.240
The free speech of professionals also implicates autonomy values, as
professionals tend to closely identify with their work. Unjustified
governmental intrusion in what professionals can and cannot say
diminishes individual liberty and autonomy.
Justice White is wrong that “professional speech” is undeserving
of First Amendment protection.241 His concurrence provides a useful
framework, however, in applying First Amendment scrutiny. Where
there is a “personal nexus between professional and client,” and the
professional “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and
purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client,” the state’s
interest in regulating speech is relatively high.242 The intimacy of
that relationship invites reliance, and makes the consumer vul-
nerable to low quality service, unethical practice, or fraud. Reason-
able speech restrictions within these relationships are likely to pass
intermediate scrutiny. But where that nexus does not exist, as in
the case of the syndicated advice columnist or the “psychologist”
candidate, the state’s interest in protecting the public is low.243 The
claims of these individuals are not offered to individual clients in an
attempt to induce their reliance, but are rather offered to the
general public and subject to public approbation or ridicule. Here,
government intrusion into speech, even nominally professional
speech, is likely to run afoul of the First Amendment.
2. Content-Neutral? Conduct Not Speech? Or a New Category of
Speech?
Although the emerging view among the circuit courts is that
professional speech should receive intermediate scrutiny,244 there is
significant variation in how courts arrive at that conclusion and the
240. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374
(2018).
241. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
242. Id.
243. See Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 354, 357-58 (5th Cir 2016); Rosemond v.
Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 586 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
244. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2014); Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fl., 760 F.3d 1195, 1230 (11th Cir. 2014); Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d
560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
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Supreme Court’s recent abortion speech case has only further mud-
died the waters.245 Some lower courts have held that restrictions on
occupational speech are really restrictions on conduct with only an
incidental effect on speech, and thus should receive intermediate
scrutiny.246 Another lower court has arrived at intermediate scrutiny
by holding that the restrictions in question were content-neutral.247
Neither of these approaches is satisfactory.
The best approach can be found in the Third Circuit’s opinion in
King, which upheld New Jersey’s ban on gay conversion therapy for
minors.248 That case avoids the mistake of the Ninth Circuit in a
similar case in concluding that therapy is “conduct” and not speech
at all.249 It also avoids the fiction, espoused by the Fifth Circuit in its
tour guide case, that restrictions on occupational speech are content-
neutral.250 Rather than using these specious ways of getting to
intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit in King drew on Justice
White’s Lowe v. SEC concurrence to define “professional speech” and
assign it, categorically, to intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.251
Unfortunately, the Court’s decision this term in National Institute
of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra252 puts the reasoning of
King on shaky ground. There, the plaintiffs challenged a California
statute that required pro-life “crisis pregnancy centers” to notify
women that California provides free or low-cost family planning
services, including abortion.253 The Ninth Circuit had categorized
the restriction as implicating “professional speech,” subjecting it to
lighter scrutiny, but the Supreme Court rejected this approach and
found that the law violated the First Amendment.254 The Court
simply said that its “precedents do not recognize ... a category called
245. See Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
246. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203; Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2013).
247. Kagan, 753 F.3d at 562.
248. King, 767 F.3d at 220.
249. See Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1055.
250. See Kagan, 753 F.3d at 562.
251. King, 767 F.3d at 229, 234-35.
252. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
253. See id. at 2368.
254. Id. at 2370, 2378.
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‘professional speech.’”255 The opinion in Family and Life Advocates
also breaks with the King approach by endorsing the nonsensical
idea that regulating professional speech is actually regulating
professional conduct, when it used that logic to distinguish the
speech restriction at issue in Casey v. Planned Parenthood.256
Yet the Court in Family and Life Advocates hardly forecloses the
King approach to professional speech rights under the First
Amendment. First, the law at issue in Family and Life Advocates
did not directly relate to occupational licensing—it regulated clinics
and not individual providers257—unlike King and the typical
professional speech case. Second, the fact that the disclosures
related to abortion—a lightning rod for public opinion and Supreme
Court jurisprudence—makes the case easily distinguishable from
the run-of-the-mill occupational licensing case.258 Finally, while the
opinion rejected the King approach of recognizing a “professional
speech” category under the First Amendment in the instant case, it
explicitly reserved the possibility of recognizing such a category in
the future.259 Lower courts should follow the King line of reasoning
in applying First Amendment scrutiny to licensing restrictions that
implicate speech. With enough thoughtful cases such as King on the
books, perhaps the Court will recognize that intermediate scrutiny
for professional speech strikes the right balance between individual
speech rights and regulatory flexibility.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE “RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING”
MOVEMENT
All this illustrates why the First and Fourteenth Amendments
should provide some minimal protection for the right to compete in
255. Id. at 2372.
256. Id. at 2372-73.
257. See id. at 2368.
258. Compare id. at 2368 (considering a challenge to a California statute that required pro-
life pregnancy “crisis centers” to notify women that California prices free low-cost family
planning services), with Edwards v. Dist. of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(considering a challenge to the District of Columbia’s requirement that tour guides acquire
a license).
259. In the words of the Court, “[w]e do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason
[to treat professional speech as a unique category under the First Amendment] exists.” Family
& Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
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an occupation, but cannot alone combat the problem of excessive
licensing. Nor should they be reinterpreted to do more. The pre-
vailing doctrine—even with several circuits holding with Craigmiles
that states must advance a public-regarding justification for
licensing260—has not been very effective at curbing licensing abuses.
Most cases uphold the licensing schemes, and the successes have
been on the margins, addressing occupations—such as hair braid-
ing261 and tour guiding262—that account for a relatively small
amount of the services market. Changing that doctrine to apply
strict scrutiny to licensing laws provides states with too little leeway
in pursuing legitimate uses of licensing. The judiciary has left
Lochner and its second-guessing of state choices about economic
regulation behind, and rightly so.
Right to earn a living advocates underestimate the unpopularity
of Lochner and the strength of resolve that almost all judges have
to avoid its resurrection. They also fail to recognize that the few
cases that seem to invoke what they call a “right to earn a living” do
so in the context of an unpopular area of regulation that many agree
has run amok: occupational licensing. Licensing gives courts the
kinds of extreme examples that should fail rationality review, or put
courts in the position of even asking whether naked economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest. When seen this way, the
cases that advocates of the right to earn a living champion are really
just tinkering at the margins of what many recognize as illegitimate
regulation.263 It is too small a hook on which to hang a new constitu-
tional economic right.
So where does this leave Elias Zarate and his lawyer Braden
Boucek? Barbering is not a talking profession, so Zarate cannot
bring a First Amendment claim. He and Boucek are stuck with
rationality review, the outcome of which, as most lawyers will tell
you, depends on the judge you get. Perhaps the judge in Zarate’s
260. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002); see St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,
712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008).
261. Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214-15 (D. Utah 2012).
262. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1009.
263. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 226-27 (striking down the regulation);
Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 978, 991 (holding the regulation failed rational basis review);
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 (finding the regulation could not pass “even rational basis
review”).
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case will recognize that requiring high school degrees for barbers is
irrational, and that it erects real barriers to employment and en-
trepreneurship for those already at the margins of society. Or per-
haps they will get a judge who sees a legitimate state interest in
regulating barbering in general, and refuses to examine the specifics
of that regulation for fear of reprising Lochner.
Win or lose, these suits are an important part of the fight against
excessive licensing. Every successful suit puts not only the plaintiff
back to work, but also the many others in that state who were
excluded by licensing, and increases competition to the benefit of
consumers. These suits are also symbolically important. They send
a message to licensing boards and legislatures that there can be
consequences to dealing out rents without regard to public benefit.
Organizations such as IJ and the Beacon Center have been pivotal
in raising the battle cry against licensing, by increasing awareness
through press releases, white papers, and social media.264 This
publicity is essential because a healthy public outrage is necessary
for what will be the most effective avenue to reform: forcing states
to take direct responsibility for regulating the occupations.
264. See Boehm, supra note 2; About Us, supra note 17.
